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The concept of mirroring has become rather ubiquitous. One of the most fundamental
empirical and theoretical debates within research on mirroring concerns the role of mental
representations: while some models argue that higher-order representational mechanisms
underpin most cases of mirroring, other models argue that they only moderate a primarily
non-representational process. As such, even though research on mirroring—along with its
neural substrates, including the putative mirror neuron system—has grown tremendously,
so too has confusion about what it actually means to “mirror”. Using recent research on
spontaneous imitation, we argue that flexible mirroring effects can be fully embodied and
dynamic—even in the absence of higher-order mental representations. We propose that
mirroring can simply reflect an adaptive integration and utilization of cues obtained from
the brain, body, and environment, which is especially evident within the social context.
Such a view offers reconciliation among both representational and non-representational
frameworks in cognitive neuroscience, which will facilitate revised interpretations of
modern (and seemingly divergent) findings on when and how these embodied mirroring
responses are employed.
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INTRODUCTION
There is now great interest in the idea of an embodied mind.
Much evidence suggests that thought and action are grounded
in perceptual and sensorimotor states, while being shaped by the
environment in which they take place (e.g., Niedenthal et al.,
2005). But how does this grounding and shaping occur, what are
the regulatory mechanisms, and when (if ever) are higher-order
representations necessary? In the current article, we explore these
questions in the context of debates about the role of mirroring in
social cognition.
One dominant idea guiding embodiment research on social
cognition is that individuals understand others by replicating
their states, using one’s own somatosensory resources. On
the neural level, this function is often assigned to the puta-
tive mirror neuron system (MNS), which “re-creates” the
observed action in the perceiver (Blakemore and Decety, 2001;
Gallese, 2003a; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Several mirror-
ing accounts appeal to higher-order representational processes
(e.g., Goldman and Sripada, 2005), and while definitions of
“mental representations” certainly do vary, those models usu-
ally view them as outcomes of propositional encoding of
incoming sensory information into language-like mental sym-
bols, which can then be internally manipulated, and finally
back-translated into motoric processes that lead to action
(Gallese, 2003a,b). We will return to these definitional issues
later.
Critically, what makes the “mirroring” idea and related phe-
nomena appealing is the possibility that they reveal a non-
representational relation to others (Gallagher, 2007; Hutto, 2007;
Sinigaglia, 2009). With the following, we illustrate and expand on
this general point, using recent literature on spontaneous imitation
(or the reflexive mimicry of another’s actions or behaviors).
Such imitation—of gestures, finger movements, facial expres-
sions, etc.—plays a role in empathy, affiliation, and rapport
(Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009). Importantly, this imitation
can sometimes be direct (e.g., smile-to-a-smile, index-finger to
index-finger, etc.), possibly reflecting operation of low-level ideo-
motor processes (Brass et al., 2000; Gallese, 2003a; Catmur et al.,
2009).
Note, however, that non-representational accounts of mir-
roring face a basic problem, when imitation is indirect: as we
will elaborate on shortly, perceivers do indeed faithfully “mirror”
or replicate the observed state—but only sometimes. In fact,
individuals often engage in adaptable, context-sensitive respond-
ing, whereby this direct perceiver-observer correspondence goes
beyond a mere reflection of what is observed. This flexibil-
ity is often highlighted by critics of the non-representational
accounts to embodiment, as presumably necessitating mediation
by higher-order representations. Indeed, some recent theories
of imitation explicitly suggest that such contextual modifi-
cation reveals the mediating role of higher-order constructs,
such as sophisticated appraisals, meaning-construction, and even
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theory-of-mind (Wang and Hamilton, 2012; Hess and Fischer,
2013).
Consequently, to address the problem of indirect imitation,
any sophisticated non-representational account needs to explain
how perceivers’ responses to the observed action reflect dynamic
integration of perception-action links, bodily states, and social-
environmental cues (Chemero, 2009). Such accounts should
explain how context-dependent shaping of embodiment can not
only occur quickly, implicitly, and with little conscious awareness,
but also how this can manifest even in animals (de Waal and
Ferrari, 2010; Barrett, 2011) and “embodied” robots (Wilson and
Golonka, 2013), which have limited capacities for higher-order
mental representations. If successful, this suggests an exciting,
novel alternative perspective on the flexibility of mirroring, where
higher-order representations are not necessary.
Our view assumes that flexible mirroring effects can be fully
embodied, dynamic, and adaptive—even in the absence of higher-
order mental representations. We propose that spontaneous mir-
roring can be “smart”, in the sense that the process can simply and
efficiently utilize integrative environmental cues. To demonstrate
this, we offer a snapshot of the recent findings on spontaneous
imitation, situated within this debate about the mediating role of
higher-order mental representations.
ARGUMENTS FOR REPRESENTATIONAL MODELS
Many representational arguments for mirroring arose during
initial interpretational debates regarding neurons in ventral
premotor cortex that discharge both during action-performance
and action-observation (originally, in area F5 of the rhesus
macaque; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). The popular
early “adaptationist” frameworks argue that the MNS was
evolutionarily selected to subserve action-understanding and
promote social learning (Iacoboni, 2009). Importantly, different
models within this broad domain vary in their explanation of
the underlying mechanisms for how mirroring is instantiated
and recruited. For instance, some argue that the observer has a
common cognitive representational format for perception and
action (i.e., active intermodal matching models; Preston and
De Waal, 2002; Meltzoff and Decety, 2003), that mirroring is
dependent on internal re-creations of others’ states in order to
facilitate understanding and co-regulation (i.e., simulationist and
embodiment frameworks; Goldman and Sripada, 2005; Semin
and Cacioppo, 2009), or that imitation is fundamentally shaped
by higher-level meaning-constructions (i.e., social and emotional
frameworks; Hamilton, 2013; Hess and Fischer, 2013; Reed and
McIntosh, 2013). Critically though, while these models differ in
how they explain the function of the MNS (and the resultant ten-
dencies toward mirroring), all agree that the cognitive and neural
resources that allow such mirroring to occur are substantially
dependent on higher-order representations, which then act to
advance action-learning, recognition, and understanding.
Arguably some of the strongest pro-representational
arguments came from the interpretation of studies showing
that our imitative capacities are “smart”—that is, mirroring
responses dynamically adapt to environmental cues, for both
motor and facial behaviors. As examples, motor imitation (e.g.,
finger-lifting, hand-opening and closing, etc.) is modulated by
prosocial attitudes (Leighton et al., 2010b), incidental similarity
(Guéguen and Martin, 2009), affiliative drive (Lakin and
Chartrand, 2003), and even eye contact (Wang et al., 2011).
Interestingly, emotional imitation exhibits an even greater bit of
flexibility: for example, spontaneous facial mimicry of emotional
expressions (i.e., smile-to-a-smile, frown-to-a-frown, etc.) can
change dramatically according to social factors, like outgroup
membership (Bourgeois and Hess, 2008), negative attitudes
(Likowski et al., 2008), competition (Weyers et al., 2009), and
social power (Carr et al., 2014). Since many of these studies use
sensitive psychophysiological techniques (e.g., electromyography
[EMG] to gauge motor activity over different facial muscles; e.g.,
Carr et al., 2014) and neuroscientific methods (e.g., single-unit
recordings in humans; Mukamel et al., 2010; see Figures 1C,D),
these findings suggest that even at the lowest level, facial
mimicry is sensitive to contextual cues, basic appraisals, and
rudimentary goal processes (Hess and Fischer, 2013). Crucially,
the representational models posit that higher-order constructs
are required for such contextual modifications to occur.
Modern research in neuroscience has furthered this
representational stance, highlighting the social adaptability
of these mirroring responses. Numerous fMRI studies have
demonstrated that when we observe another individual’s goal-
directed actions (versus other actions with no meaningful intent),
traditional ROIs associated with the MNS are activated (e.g.,
dACC, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), inferior parietal lobule
(IPL), pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA); de Lange
et al., 2008; Guionnet et al., 2012), which often co-occur with
“mentalizing” ROIs that activate when relating to others (e.g.,
mPFC, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), temporoparietal
junction (TPJ), Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Becchio et al.,
2012; see Figures 1A,B). Similar results have also been observed
in interactive dyad studies using EEG, where the social relation
to the target modulates key action-related ERP components
(e.g., contingent negative variation [CNV]; Kourtis et al., 2010)
and µ-wave suppression (Hogeveen et al., 2014; but also see
Braadbaart et al., 2013). While none of these studies prove the
existence of a mediating role for higher-order representations,
they do suggest that we have dedicated cognitive capacities that
are tuned to the social relevance of others’ actions.
One interesting aspect of mirroring in the social environment
is the possible role of the self (Mitchell, 2009). Specifically, psy-
chological studies show that the self-concept is used as a starting
point for attribution of mental states and attitudes to others, sup-
porting the anchoring-and-adjustment view (Epley and Gilovich,
2001; Epley et al., 2004; Jenkins et al., 2008; Tamir and Mitchell,
2010). Neurally, mirroring often activates regions (like anterior
intraparietal sulcus (aIPS), posterior superior temporal sulcus
(pSTS), and PMC; see Figure 1A) that complement the “men-
talizing” system (involving the TPJ and MPFC; see Figure 1B).
Moreover, studies that use single-pulse TMS (which measure
motor-evoked potentials [MEPs]) suggest that social perspective-
taking and goal-directedness impacts motor preparation during
very early processing stages (Obhi et al., 2011; Sartori et al.,
2011; Hogeveen and Obhi, 2012; Cardellicchio et al., 2013; Senna
et al., 2014). In sum, it appears that one way mirroring adapts
to the social context is via mechanisms that involve the self and
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FIGURE 1 | Human neural responses when mirroring and responding
to others. Panels A and B (figure and caption are reprinted from Van
Overwalle and Baetens (2009) with permission from Elsevier) depict
the regions of interest involved in the mirror and mentalizing system
placed in an x–y–z Talairach atlas. Their centers are indicated by a dot
and include pSTS (±50 −55 10), TPJ (±50 −55 25), aIPS (±40 −40
45), PMC (±40 5 40) and mPFC (0 50 20). The PC (with center 0
−60 40) is not shown. The regions are drawn based on the recent
literature and, in particular, on Keysers and Gazzola (2006, panel A) for
the mirror system and on Van Overwalle (2009, panel B) for the
mentalizing system. Panels C and D (figure and caption are reprinted
from Mukamel et al. (2010) with permission from Elsevier) show neural
responses of two cells during all experimental conditions and tasks,
which depicts an action observation/execution matching multiunit in left
SMA for the two grips (precision and whole-hand; panel C) and an
action observation/execution matching single unit in right entorhinal
cortex for two facial gestures (smile and frown; panel D). Rasters (top)
are aligned to stimulus onset (red vertical line at time = 0). Bin size
for peristimulus time histogram (bottom) is 200 ms. Red box highlights
responses passing statistical criteria.
that progress in the debate about the representational nature of
mirroring could be made by analyzing these mechanisms more
in-depth.
Overall, while the above studies do not necessarily show that
the mirroring mechanism is inherently representational, they do
again suggest that the social nature of observed actions results
in the dynamic adjustment of our own “smart” imitation. Partly
as a result of such evidence, the non-representational mirroring
theories have to be formulated (or reformulated) to explain
how context-sensitivity could result less from higher-order
representations, and more from simpler variables such as sensori-
motor training, perception-action links, and developmental inter-
actions with the social environment—which we move on to next.
SUPPORT FOR NON-REPRESENTATIONAL FRAMEWORKS
Recently, newer theories have been proposed for mirroring
that reverse the logic underlying representational models. For
example, one major non-representational framework proposes
that “mirror neurons” are formed as a result of a domain-
general learning mechanism that pairs contingent and contiguous
perception and action (Heyes, 2011). According to this theory,
spontaneous imitation can still adapt to context because different
perception-action links can be selectively triggered in a particular
setting (i.e., contextual modification). Critically however, the
MNS does not code the goal-directed nature of observed actions,
nor does it necessarily even strictly “mirror” those perceived
behaviors (Cook and Bird, 2013; Cook et al., 2014). Other non-
representational accounts for mirroring echo this same general
sentiment, but instead argue that action-understanding is purely
motoric in nature and based within the specific neural func-
tion of the MNS (Sinigaglia, 2009), which is then developed
through supportive environmental interactions like narrative
and social observation (Hutto, 2007). Generally though, non-
representational frameworks question one of the fundamental
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aspects of representational models—the involvement of higher-
order constructs that map another’s actions onto one’s own
body, in order to solve this so-called “correspondence problem”
(Iacoboni, 2009).
Much work in psychology and neuroscience on spontaneous
imitation in humans appears to support this non-representational
perspective. Overall, such studies have shown that mirroring can
be quite automatic, yet is quickly reversible and contextually
modifiable by low-level perceptual and motor factors. For exam-
ple, normal patterns of automatic motor imitation can be reversed
through brief periods of “counter-mirror training” (Catmur et al.,
2007), and simple visual feedback improves facial imitative train-
ing (Cook et al., 2013). Furthermore, spontaneous imitation is
influenced by low-level stimulus-related features, like visual con-
text and stimulus velocity (Bisio et al., 2010), kinematic fidelity
(Eaves et al., 2012), and testing environment (Cook et al., 2012b).
Recall that under representational models, mirroring should be
goal-directed; however, recent experiments have shown that this
process does not always encode behavioral goals (Bird et al., 2007;
Leighton et al., 2010a), persisting in social situations even against
strong competitive incentives not to imitate (Belot et al., 2013)
and even in settings when participants are clearly convinced that a
model, such as an android, lacks any intentionality (Hofree et al.,
in press). While this is not necessarily direct evidence for non-
representational accounts (since some representations might be
unconscious), it definitely argues against the explicit representa-
tional notion of goals and intentions—especially given that these
mirroring modifications often manifest quickly, unconsciously,
and physiologically.
Further, research on spontaneous imitation in animals
provides some of the most convincing evidence for non-
representational frameworks, since higher-level representations
should presumably be less relevant (or non-existent). In short,
humans are not the only ones that can flexibly imitate (see
Figure 2): past work has demonstrated spontaneous imitation in
primates (Byrne and Tanner, 2006; Ferrari et al., 2006; Bard, 2007;
Voelkl and Huber, 2007; Haun and Call, 2008; Dindo et al., 2010),
birds (Fawcett et al., 2002; Zentall, 2004; Mui et al., 2008), rats
(Heyes et al., 1994), and even dogs (Miller et al., 2009). In fact,
even in animals, spontaneous imitation seems to be socially spe-
cific and selective. As examples, capuchin monkeys display greater
affiliation towards humans who imitate them (Paukner et al.,
2009) and dogs can selectively imitate a human behavior that is
more preferential in nature (Range et al., 2007). In short, these
studies showing contextual imitation in animals challenge the idea
that higher-order, explicit representations drive the flexible and
efficient social adjustment of imitative responses.
Moreover, other non-human examples of imitation further
highlight this possibility of a more “radical”, non-representational
mirroring account. For instance, dolphins have been shown to
have an advanced capacity for social spontaneous imitation, but
this appears to be largely dependent on perception-action inter-
actions with the environment. Specifically, when dolphins are
blindfolded, they still copy target behaviors, but they change to
a strategy that is more dependent on echolocation (i.e., detecting
relevant behaviors through sound), rather than traditional visual
routes of perception. Consequently, the authors posit that “such
flexibility in changing perceptual routes demonstrates that the
dolphin’s imitation was not automatically elicited, but rather
results from an intentional, problem-solving approach to imi-
tation [that utilizes the surrounding environment]” (Jaakkola
et al., 2013). While numerous examples exist for this perception-
action strategy in adjusting to the environment, not all based
in the literature on spontaneous imitation (e.g., mate selection
by crickets, pack hunting by wolves, etc.; Wilson and Golonka,
2013), the key point here is that social adaptation (including
imitative behaviors) can be perceptually grounded without the
need for representational mediation, at least in these non-human
subjects.
Similarly, other work on “embodied” robots supports
this non-representational notion that imitative behaviors can
be entrained within the environment (e.g., via hierarchical
FIGURE 2 | Demonstrations of spontaneous imitation in non-humans.
Two examples of a neonatal macaque’s imitative response to (A) mouth
opening and (B) tongue protrusion (reprinted from Ferrari et al., 2006). (C)
Experimenter and female orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus) interacting in the
contingent/matching condition showing an example of testing behavior
(reprinted from Haun and Call (2008) with permission from Elsevier). (D)
Apparatus with dog at the start of a test trial (top panel), and apparatus as dog
is starting to make a screen-push response as test for imitation (bottom
panel) (reprinted from Miller et al. (2009) with permission from Elsevier). (E)
Starlings engaging in a two-action method task for imitative learning, with a
push demonstrator (top panel) and a pull demonstrator (bottom panel)
(reprinted from Fawcett et al. (2002) with permission from Elsevier).
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optimization learning strategies; Billard et al., 2004; Argall et al.,
2009). Interestingly, these methods can actually result in socially
and emotionally responsive humanoids (Breazeal, 2003). Such
spontaneous imitation in robots can even be “goal-directed”,
where task behaviors are preferentially selected (Calinon et al.,
2005), and these “representations” are developed purely through
autonomous interactions with the physical environment (Ijspeert
et al., 2002; Wischmann et al., 2006; Gigliotta and Nolfi, 2008).
These findings are especially intriguing, given that non-human
agents obviously cannot depend on internal cognitive resources,
which would be necessary for imitation to occur according to
representational models.
In sum, non-representational frameworks emphasize that
mirroring responses usually seen in spontaneous imitation
are perceptually and motorically grounded within the greater
context of the social environment—and not solely through
the manipulation of higher-order representations. This idea
is supported by research demonstrating that spontaneous
imitation can occur quickly and implicitly, responding to
biologically implausible or impossible actions (Liepelt and Brass,
2010) or persisting in situations that make little sense from a
social perspective (Cook et al., 2012a; Hofree et al., in press).
Intriguingly, this non-representational mirroring account also
follows across other areas of literature, given “smart” imitation
findings in non-human agents, like robots and animals (see the
following for a review: Huber et al., 2009; de Waal and Ferrari,
2010; Gawronski and Cesario, 2013).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this mini-review, we have addressed a fundamental debate sur-
rounding research and theory on mirroring—the role of mental
representations. We argued that spontaneous imitation highlights
the flexible, dynamic, yet still embodied aspects of mirroring—
even in the absence of higher-order representations. Note that
these frameworks do not have to be mutually exclusive on all
fronts. For instance, both accounts posit that developmental
experience and social context can modify mirroring responses
(albeit, to different extents). Thus, while acknowledging that
these models contain certain areas of overlap, the most valuable
empirical advances will be made in investigating when and how
these divergent imitative patterns manifest.
While this is indeed a difficult question to address, we believe
that investigations of mirroring within the social context will
be most informative: as examples, while non-representational
studies have shown modulations of “automatic” imitation
through the manipulation of low-level factors (e.g., stimulus-
related perceptual cues), such paradigms often strip these stimuli
of their real-world social relevance, where mirroring (and the use
of representations) could be the most crucial. Also, higher-order
representations may be especially useful with mirroring in novel
social situations (where “mentalizing” is required), and the
self is used to “bootstrap” mental states onto the other person
(e.g., Mitchell, 2009; Tamir and Mitchell, 2010). On the other
hand, more straightforward social scenarios may not require
the instantiation of the self-concept as a reference in mirroring
(or its related mental representations). Such an interpretation
might suggest that the existence of representations in mirroring
responses should not be the primary question, compared
to examining how mirroring transitions between simple and
“smart” states, especially within varying social situations.
Explorations into such questions will prove especially
beneficial with newer advances in both technology (e.g., single-
unit recordings in humans during action-observation and
performance; Mukamel et al., 2010; see Figures 1C,D) and
methodology (e.g., using “counter-mirror training” to study
imitation in social situations; Catmur et al., 2007). Additionally,
non-representational frameworks do not have to be “all-or-
nothing”, since there are multiple levels of interpretation that
can be employed. For instance, while some non-representational
mirroring accounts would posit a more “radical” mindset
(whereby these responses are purely driven by perception-action
interactions with the environment, thus replacing complex
internal representations; Wilson and Golonka, 2013), others
may argue that higher-order representations are just another
moderator of an otherwise non-representational mirroring
process. In turn, evaluating the functional role of representations
in mirroring would be especially informative, where future
studies not only explore the co-occurrence of goal-directed
“mentalizing” ROIs (e.g., via fMRI), but also what happens to
mirroring when these ROIs are impeded (e.g., via TMS)?
Going forward, we argue for a flexible embodiment framework
that is both simple and “smart”—a view that offers a recon-
ciliation among “traditional” symbolic perspectives in cognitive
neuroscience and more “radical”, non-representational theories of
embodied processing. Critically, such a mindset will encourage
new insights into the interpretation of modern (and seemingly
divergent) findings from numerous fields across psychology and
neuroscience—particularly on when and how these embodied
imitative responses are engaged.
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